Databases as a Service (DaaS) are recently in the spotlight as an essential component of the cloud computing framework. We can more easily develop applications to facilitate users' collaboration than without DaaS. Unfortunately, DaaS brings a new risk of data compromise because most data are currently stored and managed by the service provider.
INTRODUCTION
Database as a Service (DaaS) is a component of the cloud computing framework and it is attracting someone's atten-
tion. Nowadays major companies launch DaaS and many
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. To guarantee the safety, there are three kinds of studies for this purpose; 1) security of data stored in servers; 2) preventing guess of data from query analysis; 3) protecting personal information of users such as interest or favorite from query analysis. In the study of security of data, data are encrypted at trusted clients before sending to the server.
Therefore even server cannot know what data are stored but the server also cannot process queries. How to process queries on the encrypted data is a main topic of this research. For solving the problem, current encrypted data have some indices for query processing [5, 4] . Another topic of the study of security of data stored in servers is how to share data stored in encrypted database. This topic is how to share the encryption key between the authorized users.
Damiani et al. introduced a method of dynamically deriving the encryption keys and reducing the number of keys each user has to manage [1] . The second group of the studies; preventing guess of data from query analysis is well known for the problem of k-anonimity [8] . There are many kinds of specic problems and solutions for them. There is a demand of requesting data but keeping how data is requested secret for servers. This demand is called as Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [3] and PIR is the third category of the studies.
In this paper, we add a new problem to the studies. It is a problem of protecting social information. Social information, which we think as opposite idea of personal information identifying each person, has not been discussed yet.
However, many researches about social network from web services are nowadays studied. Discussing security of social information as privacy issue is therefore becoming signicant. We are not identied by only social information but organizational size, how organization work, our role in organizations may be leaked. We would not generally like to take all association public therefore we must have a right of deciding public or secret about social information as same as personal information. Thinking about a scenario of using DaaS, this service is used by not only individual but also enterprise. In such case, organization structure is important condential.
We rstly introduce an attack model of social information. For setting the model, we focus attention on query log and presupposed users who send same and discriminative queries have high relativity. Secondly, we discuss a method of query alteration to conceal social information from the attack model. In our proposal approach, some dierent queries are rewritten to a same query using query transfer tree based on the extendible hashing [2] . Finally we set a cost function and use a property of extendible hashing, that is the distribution of the number of hash value stored in each leaf is at, to optimize the cost. Our contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) We raise a new security problem about social information; 2) We introduce a concrete algorithm of analyzing social information from query logs in the DaaS scenario; 3) We propose a method of query conversion to protect social information from query analysis. We consider an application using DaaS. Let U be the set of users who send requests to the server, and let L be the set of literals received by the server. An attacker peeping requests can count how many literal l ∈ L are sent by the user u ∈ U : the attacker has a logging function of
ATTACK MODEL
We next introduce a method of calculating similarities from the observed data using a query feature vector for a method of extracting social information. Analysis of user similarity using a query feature vector presupposes that users who sent the same request have a relation. For example, users who ask an event at a particular date and place have an interest: they have a relation in this meaning. Analyses of user similarity calculate frequencies for how a user pair sends the same query and extracts a user pair to which they have high similarity. The query feature vector of a user is calculated using the frequency of the literals in requests from that user.
The attacker observes how many users u sent a literal l as Log(u, l) described above. The user frequency of the literal l: uf l , which is how many users sent the literal, is calculated using the following formulation.
For the weight of a user u and a literal l; w u,l is dened as We dened the query feature vector of user u: QV u . The feature vector comprises the weights as elements.
In this paper, we dene the similarity of user u and v as sim(u, v), by the cosine degree, as
Attackers set a threshold θ and assess a user pair that has a similarity that is greater than the threshold as related users.
QUERY CONVERSION
We start by introducing a sketch of our approach before describing intimate algorithms related to query conversion. Figure 1 depicts the basic ow.
As an example, we consider a schedule management application. On the application, we attempt to convert the following query: where match is the function comparing a binary string and converted strings. The server can use these functions.
Query conversion converts dierent queries into the same new query. For that reason, the result of converted queries might have many irrelevant items. Therefore, the intermediate server execute an original query to results so that unnecessary items are removed, and users and applications can obtain items as desired.
In the rest of this chapter, we rstly dene the conversion tree and then we explain our algorithm of the conversion.
Structure of Conversion Tree
Our conversion tree T is based on extensible hash and Fig.   2 presents a sample of it. We formally dene it as
Therein, V is a set of nodes and root ∈ V is the root node of tree T . Our tree has nodes of two kinds: inner nodes and leaf nodes. The inner node (shown as a circle in Fig. 2 ) has a set of child nodes. The leaf node (shown as a box in Fig. 2 ) has a set of literals mapped to the leaf node. Edges connecting a node to another node have a label, where L is a set of literals converted this tree and Counter is a counter that counts the requests of every user. We use numbers recorded by the counter as a function. Therefore, let Count(u, l) represent the number of users u ∈ U who request literal l ∈ L.
Query Conversion Algorithm
When the conversion server receives a query: attr = l, it translates the literal l in the query into the binary string b: b = binary(hash(l)), where hash is a hashing function and binary is a function converting an input to the binary string.
The conversion server processes the binary string by steps shown in Algorithm 1. First, the counter of a requesting user u and the literal l (C ounter(u, l) ) is incremented by one, If a user's request has more than two literals, for example requesting from a date and a place, we use as many conversion trees as the literals contained in the request.
Update of Conversion Tree
Our proposed approach binds some queries and converts another query. Consequently, we prevent attackers from inferring the social information from observed query logs.
However, binding some queries causes users to obtain items they did not ask for, which means that the cost increases.
We restrict the conversion tree dynamically to keep the cost under a given maximum cost.
The conversion tree is updated when a user converts a query. We imagine that a user sends a query and that the query is mapped to a leaf node n; and we let the depth of node n be d. In this condition, the literals Ls in the leaf node n are rst divided into two subsets Ls 0 and Ls 1 , literals for which the d-th character is 0 and 1 respectively belong to Ls0 and Ls1. Then, Ls0 and Ls1 are examined as to whether they should be divided or not. The tree removes the leaf nodes n and adds two leaf nodes n 0 and n 1 , which respectively have the set of literals Ls0 and Ls1 if the subsets are divided by the judgment. Figure 3 portrays this update process. The old leaf node n containing the set of literals Ls is changed to an inner node to connect new leaf nodes; also, new leaf nodes n 0 and n 1 are added and connected to the inner node. The new edges from the inner node to n0 and n1 respectively bear labels 0 and 1.
Determination of the divide is done according to the following steps considering costs. The costs cost 0 and cost 1 are rst calculated, respectively, for the subsets Ls 0 and Ls 1 :
The leaf node n are divided into the two leaf nodes n 0 and n 1 if at least one of the costs cost 0 and cost 1 are bigger than a given max allowable cost c. The following conditions are computed for each subset if the costs are less than the c.
When the condition presented above is true for L 0 and L 1 , then the leaf nodes n are divided into the two leaf nodes n0 and n1. The condition means a summation for every literal of a dierence of rates for how many users u and v sent a literal l. That it is so small is an expression of a dierence of rates; the number of users u and v who sent literals mapped in the nodes n 0 and n 1 is small, which is a dierent tendency from that by which requests observed by attackers are small. Consequently, nodes are divided if the intractability of analyzing similarity can remain high, even if the cost is not great.
For this determination, a conversion server must record the number of items N l matching a request l. The server therefore must examine insert and delete events for the databases.
EVALUATION EXPERIMENT

Dataset used for Experiments
We have an experiment to evaluate our proposal. For this experiment, we need a dataset that has users belonging to some groups and queries by the users to DaaS. Unfortunately, such public datasets are apparently unavailable.
Therefore we choose an open dataset which is used by Alexander et al. for evaluating query processing on a P2P network [6] . This dataset is based on the OpenDirectory [7] .
OpenDirectory is a project for classifying web sites; it has hierarchical categories. Each category has more segmentalized categories and web sites which are categorized in the category. Each web site might belong to more than two categories. Meaning that the editor of a web site belongs to some category group. In our experiment, we use web sites in OpenDirectory as users and categories as groups as same as the experiment by Alexander et al. That is the dataset is reect a real community: people might belong to some interest group.
In this experiment, we use categories for which the depth is less than ve and use web sites belonging to the categories.
Then we create 100,000 queries on the users and groups.
Our conguration is that each user must request web sites belonging to a group similarly to a user who would use the web site. The number of queries depends on the Zipf distribution, which is often used in studies of social networks [9] .
We calculate the similarity over the converted queries for the dataset; the dataset has 133,602 users and 6,280 groups.
Result
Next, we explain the results. We use the precision and recall for measurement of success of attacks. The lower precision and recall therefore indicate higher safety. The x-axes of cost graphs show cost; the y-axes show the numbers of users. They therefore express that 100 users have 5 cost points if a point stands for (5, 100). The cost value of user u is computed using the following formula;
where N l be the number of items received from the server as a result of a request literal l. That is the formulation expresses an average of the number of items user u receive from the server. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As described herein, we introduce a new privacy problem security of social information to produce safer DaaS than that which services already provide. Social information is information about relation between users: it diers from personal information because personal information is information identifying individual users. Therefore, it has been treated as unimportant. Nevertheless, many methods of analyzing social networks are studied so that the relation information can present risk. We believe that discussing social information is important to retain privacy.
Based on these situations, we introduce an attack method of exposing social information from analyzing queries. We propose a method to defend the attack by rewriting the queries. Our proposal has two parameters related to safety and cost; users can choose them according to their demand.
Moreover, we evaluate our proposal using an experiment based on real information: an open directory. Based on the result, a specic pair of parameters yields high security and low overhead. However, our method must incur large costs depending on circumstances: more improvement is necessary.
We envision our future work as improvement of the attack method and query conversion to protect privacy from stronger attacks.
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